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Abstract
This paper estimates the demand for flights in an international air travel market
using a unique dataset with detailed information not only on flight choices but also on
contemporaneous prices and characteristics of all the alternative non-booked flights.
The estimation strategy employs a simple discrete choice random utility model that we
use to analyze how choices and its response to prices depend on the departing airport,
the identity of the carrier, and the departure date and time. The results show that
a 10% increase in prices in a 100-seat aircraft throughout a 100-period selling season
decreases quantity demanded by 7.7 seats. We also find that the quantity demanded is
more responsive to prices for Delta and American, during morning and evening flights
and that the response to prices changes significantly over different departure dates.
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1 Introduction
The main goal of empirical studies of differentiated product markets is the estimation of
the demand and the modeling of choices. The common practice is to estimate random
utility models of consumer demand using discrete choice models. A typical problem in this
type of estimation is the difficulty in obtaining the data on choices and on all the available
options. This paper proposes using a unique dataset on prices and transactions to estimate
discrete choice models that explain individual choices at the flight level. In our data we
observe not only the flight choices and the corresponding prices but also the prices and
characteristics of all the non-booked alternative flights. We are able to estimate how air
travel demand changes depending on the departure date, the departure time, the identity
of the carrier and the departing airport. The passenger choice model presented here can be
vital to the development and the assessment of new pricing strategies, capacity choices, or
route entry/exit decision. Moreover, it opens the door to a large number of other discrete
choice models that can be estimated using similar datasets. These include, for example,
models to forecast demand, estimation of market power, cross-price elasticities, single agent
dynamic models, or dynamic games.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that estimates the itinerary choice
(i.e., flight choice) in a revealed preference setting where information on choices and all the
alternative flights is available. The information on all options is important because this
is part of the information set available to customers when they make their choices. This
allows an easy construction of the representative utility in a random utility model. When
not all the available alternatives are observed the estimation is complicated due to the lack
of information on the arrival rates. For example, some unobserved customers can arrive
and purchase from a seller that is not in the data.1
The airline industry has already demonstrated to be a popular place for the estimation
of discrete choice models using aggregate data from the U.S. Department of Transportation.
However, these data is too aggregate to estimate the individual choices. Estimating discrete
choice models of demand employs aggregate market level data, consumer level data or
1When there is missing data one potential solution is to use the techniques described in Newman et
al.(2012).
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both. Aggregate level data usually has aggregate quantity, prices, consumer characteristics,
market size and sometimes the distribution of demographics. It has the advantage that
in most cases it is easier to get. Consumer-level data has individual choices, prices and
characteristics of all options. The distribution of demographics is optional. It has the
advantage that it is more detailed than aggregate data, but it is more difficult to obtain. We
use posted prices and inventory changes following a similar collection strategy as Escobari
(2012) and Escobari and Lee (2012).
In this paper we focus on the international market between the three big airports serving
New York City (Newark Liberty, John F. Kennedy and La Guardia) and the main airport
in Toronto (Toronto Pearson International). The data covers all the 317 flights from the
six carriers that served this city pair between December 19 and 24, 2008. We cover the
advance sales during forty days leading to the departure dates. Counting the choices and
the available alternatives we have more than half a million observations in our dataset. The
results from the estimation of our random utility framework show that a 10% increase in
prices throughout a 100-period selling season decreases quantity demanded by 7.7 seats in a
100-seat flight. We also find that demand is greater closer to departure. When allowing the
response of quantity demanded to prices to change with the identity of the carrier we found
that Delta Airlines had the most price responsive demand followed by American Airlines
and Air Canada. Additional results show that less responsive demand is associated with
departure dates that have more congestion and higher prices and that the responsiveness
to prices varies significantly across departure dates. Finally, demand is more responsive to
prices for flights that depart from John F. Kennedy and during morning flights.
There is important related literature in airlines that uses discrete choice estimations
aimed at modeling consumer choices. Pels et al.(2001) and Hess and Polak (2005) use data
from an airline passenger survey to estimate various logit models of airport and airline
choice for the San Francisco Bay area. Ashiabor et al.(2007) use the 1995 American Travel
Survey to forecast travel demand, while Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1999) and Wen and
Lai (2012) also use survey data to estimate the choice of carrier. It is important to notice
that survey data basically creates trip scenarios to simulate the booking process. These
surveys record stated preferences and not revealed preferences based on actual choices that
result in transactions. Our data comes from the actual behavior of the interaction between
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sellers and buyers recorded by sales and posted prices. Carrier (2008) estimates itinerary
choice using booking data, but does not have the non-booked travel alternatives as we do.
Using revealed preferences from a single major European airline and stated preferences,
Atasoy and Bierlaire (2012) present an itinerary choice model. Related literature on airlines
that used the most common Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) from the U.S.
Department of Transportation includes Berry (1992) who estimates a structural discrete-
choice model of entry for the airline industry. Berry and Jia (2010) present a structural
model and estimate the impact of demand and supply changes on profitability during the
turmoil in the industry in the early 2000s, while Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) used a partially
identified entry model to investigate the heterogeneity in carriers profits.2
While we propose using posted prices, inventory changes and discrete choice models to
explain demand side behavior, posted prices data has been very popular for the estimation
of pricing strategies and supply side behavior. Stavins (2001) uses posted prices from the
Official Airline Guide to find that price dispersion attributed to ticket restrictions increases
with competition. More recently McAfee and te Velde (2007) looks at price dynamics, van
Eggermond et al.(2007) at travelers itinerary in European markets, Mantin and Koo (2009)
study dynamic price dispersion, and Alderighi (2010) explains fare dispersion. Bilotkach
et al.(2011) show empirically how yield management is effective in raising a flight’s load
factor, while Bilotkach and Rupp (2012) study the intertemporal profile and the role of low-
cost carriers and differences across online distributors. The intertemporal profile of fares
in also studied in Bergantino and Capozza (2012), who find a J-curve and in Alderighi
et al.(2012) who find a U-shape and that fares increase with occupancy rate. Escobari
(2012) estimates a dynamic demand equation and a dynamic supply equation that jointly
explain the dynamics of fares and sales as the departure date nears, Escobari and Lee (2012)
estimate price reaction functions to capture the interaction between flights, and Escobari
et al.(2013) shows empirically how airlines dynamically price discriminate.3
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the collection
of the data and presents the summary statistics. The explanation of the discrete choice
2See also Armantier and Richard (2008), and more recently Gedge et al.(2013).
3On the theoretical side, Deneckere and Peck (2012) present a theory to explain price posting in a
multiple period version of the models presented in Dana (1998) and Dana (1999).
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empirical model is presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results, while Section 5
discusses possible extensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data for this paper was collected from the online travel agency Expedia.com following
a similar strategy as in Escobari (2012) and Escobari and Lee (2012). We not only have
information on all contemporaneous posted prices at different points in time for all available
options (i.e., flights) but also on seat inventory levels. We use the changes in inventories to
identify a sale. Hence our data replicates the information displayed to individuals who buy
tickets online and records their choices. To control for various sources of price dispersion
and demand variation across customers we focus on the lowest available one-way non-stop
economy class nonrefundable posted fare. Looking only at one-way non-stop tickets helps
define a single inventory at each price and helps control for tickets sold as part of round-trips
or longer itineraries.
As in Escobari (2012), even if one-way tickets are a small fraction of the overall tickets
sold, our observed prices are relevant as long as the carriers adjust these prices based on the
current inventory levels. Moreover, sales (obtained as inventory changes) can be the result
of tickets sold at prices different than the one-way prices - for example, as a round-trip
ticket where one of the legs is in our sample. Then our demand estimation is also capturing
the demand of round-trip tickets if one-way tickets are always priced half of the round-trip
tickets, which is the standard assumption in the airline pricing empirical literature.4 In
addition, to make the problem tractable we focus on a single city pair, New York City to
Toronto which already generates over half-a-million observations. Because there are three
big airports that serve New York City, we collected the data for all three airports, Newark
Liberty International Airport (EWR), John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), and
La Guardia Airport (LGA). The only airport in Toronto that we consider is the Toronto
Pearson International Airport (YYZ), which is the only big airport that serves this city.
We have sales and pricing information on all the flights that departed between December
19 and December 24, 2008. Moreover, we keep record of the prices and inventory changes
4See for example Borenstein and Rose (1994, p. 677), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009, p. 5).
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every three days between 40 days to departure and 1 day to departure for all these flights.
Overall this included 317 flights from American Airlines, Air Canada, Continental, Delta,
Lan Chile, and United, with 10,708 tickets sold during our period of study. The details
of the 317 flights by carrier and by departure date are presented in Table 1, which is
reproduced from Escobari and Lee (2012).5 Each time a ticket was sold, we recorded the
corresponding price and the prices of all competing flights for the same day of departure.
This makes our data replicate the information available to the buyer as well as the same
structure as required for the estimation of discrete choice models. Each consumer at the
time of arriving to buy a ticket observes all posted prices and chooses the flight that gives
him the highest utility. On average we have that for each recorded ticket transaction we
there are 52 competing flights. For example, if a traveler buys a ticket from United to
fly on December 24, we also record the contemporaneous posted prices for the other 49
competing flights as detailed in Table 1.
[Table 1, about here]
In addition to sales and prices that allows estimating airline demand, the data is in-
teresting because allows demand comparisons between departing airports, departure dates,
carriers, and departure times. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for these variables.
The first four columns report the typical statistics, while columns 5 through 8 reports the
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum prices for each of the classifications
dictated by the dummy categories. The figures show that the dominant carrier in this city
pair is Air Canada with 30.9% of the flights, followed by United with 25.8% and by Amer-
ican Airlines with 20.8%. Moreover, there is substantial price dispersion in the sample.
The lowest priced ticket at US$ 65 is more than 16 times cheaper than the most expensive
ticket. The busiest airport is La Guardia, while most flights depart in the morning. It
is interesting to notice that while the overall average price is US$ 169.80 (column 1), the
average price at which a transaction occurred is US$ 156.93 (column 5).
5While the data collection process in Escobari and Lee (2012) is the same as in this paper, here the
structure and approach is very different. Escobari and Lee (2012) have 4,398 observations on posted prices.
Here we have 560,244 observations that keep track of the posted prices of all the available flights for every
time we observe a sale.
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[Table 2, about here]
There are important advantages in the structure of the collection of the data and in
focusing on this particular city pair. First, direct flights between New York City and
Toronto take only one hour and a half, hence it is reasonable to think that combination
of flights connecting this city pair with one or more stops are not a desired alternative for
travelers. Moreover, focusing on non-stop flights and one-way fares is useful to control for
fare differences associated to round-trip tickets and open jaws. For example, these tickets
are usually associated with Saturday-night-stay restrictions or minimum-, and maximum-
stay restrictions. This would involve tickets of a significantly different quality. Selecting
the least expensive available non-refundable ticket is important to control for the existence
of more expensive refundable tickets that are also available for purchase at different points
prior to departure. Finally, focusing on economy class tickets controls for some consumer’s
heterogeneity as some higher valuation consumers may want to buy first-class tickets. We
consider refundable and first class tickets to be of a significantly different quality.
3 Empirical Model
Consider the following random utility model framework in which travelers are assumed to
be utility maximizers. We adapt the model of Chapter 2 in Train (2002) for our setting.6
Let traveler n face a choice of traveling in any of J different flights. Notice that these J
flights are all the available flight options shown by the online travel agency. The utility of
individual n obtained from alternative j ∈ J is Unj . This level of utility is known by the
traveler but not by the econometrician. We assume that the traveler already decided to fly
over other transportation alternatives (e.g., driving or renting a car). Hence, he will choose
the flight that gives him the highest level of utility. That is, he will choose flight i if and
only if Uni > Unj for all j 6= i. Even thought the econometrician cannot observe the utility
levels, some of the flights’ attributes including the price can be observed. We label them as
xnj and pn respectively. We will relate these observed factors to the traveler’s utility with
6Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) study a similar buyers’ choice behavior from a revenue management
perspective. For a detailed discussion of discrete choice models of airline demand see Garrow (2010).
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the function Vnj = V (xnj , pnj), which is called the representative utility. Some attributes
in xnj can include, for example, departure time, departure date, departing airport, and
identity of the carrier.
From the econometrician’s view point, utility levels Unj contain some random unob-
served component that make Unj 6= Vnj . We then write Unj = Vnj +εnj , with εnj being the
stochastic component of utility. We write f(εn) as the joint density of the random vector
εn = {εn1, εn2, . . . , εnJ}. Then the probability that traveler n chooses alternative i is given
by,
Pni = Prob(Uni > Unj ∀j 6= i), (1)
= Prob(Vni + εni > Vnj + εnj ∀j 6= i),
= Prob(εnj < εni + Vni − Vnj ∀j 6= i).
Assume that εnj is distributed independent and identically distributed extreme value.
Hence, the distribution of each unobserved component of utility is:
f(εnj) = e
−εnje−e
−εnj
, (2)
with the cumulative distribution being F (εnj) = e
−e−εnj . Because the difference between
two extreme value variables is logistic we have
F (εnj − εni) = e
εnj−εni
1 + eεnj−εni
. (3)
From Equation (1) if εni is taken as given, the cumulative probability distribution for
each εnj evaluated at εni + Vni − Vnj based on Equation (3) is e−e
−εni+Vni−Vnj
. Following
the assumption of independence, this cumulative distribution over all j 6= i is the product
of the individual cumulative distributions:
Pni|εni =
∏
j 6=i
e−e
−εni+Vni−Vnj
. (4)
Because εni is not given, we need to take the integral of Pni|εni over all values of εni
weighted by the density of εni:
Pni =
∫ (∏
j 6=i
e−e
−εni+Vni−Vnj
)
e−εnie−e
−εnidεni (5)
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that has the integral equal to
Pni =
eVni∑
j e
Vnj
(6)
which is the equation for the logit choice probability. Because we have a panel the utility
that the traveler n obtains from buying a ticket on flight j at time t is given by,
Unjt = βanjt + αjpnjt + µj + εnjt. (7)
In Equation (7) we model the systematic component of utility as a linear function of
the parameters, Vnjt = βanjt + αjpnjt + εj . β and αj are coefficients to be estimated
and the variables anjt and pnjt are the number of days in advance the ticket was bought
and the price. Our main variable of interest is αj which captures the marginal utility of
a price increase. Of course we expect αj to be negative, hence −αj is the disutility of a
price increase. The key element in which flights are differentiated are all time invariant
and captured by µj , the time-invariant fixed effect specific to flight j. This one controls for
observed and unobserved flight specific characteristics such as departure time, departure
date, identity of the carrier, distance between the cities, or the carrier’s managerial capacity.
As a first approach we fix αj = α ∀j but then we allow αj to change with time invariant
flight specific characteristics. Then the systematic component of utility will be modeled as
Vnjt = βanjt + (δ
′xnj) · pnjt + µj where we just allow αj in Equation (7) to be αj = δ′xnj .
The vector of variables xnj includes departure time, departure date, the identity of the
carrier and the departing airport. This is alternative specification in helpful to determine
how demand for a flights changes with these characteristics. There are some assumptions
for the validity of the estimation of Equation (7) that discuss in detail along with the results
in the next section.
4 Results
In this section we present the discrete choice logit estimates of the demand. For comparison
purposes we also report the linear pooled OLS as well as the linear fixed effects estimates.
Table 3 present the base model of Equation (7) where anjt is relabeled as Advance,
the number of days prior to departure fares and the sale was recorded. For pnjt we use
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LogPrice, the natural logarithm of Price. For simplicity we omit the subscripts njt
from the names of the variables. The negative and statistically significant coefficients on
Advance in columns 1 and 3 suggest that sales (demand) increases closer to departure.
However, this result is not robust across specifications as the fixed effects estimate finds
a non-significant coefficient. Notice that the reported logit coefficients are the marginal
effects obtained when evaluating the other regressors at their mean levels.
It is important to notice that LogPrice in the estimation is potentially endogenous.
Endogeneity arises if there is correlation between pnjt and the unobserved µj + εnjt. The
most common cause of this correlation is if the carrier sets prices knowing more about the
error term than the econometrician. Escobari (2012) controls for potential endogeneity in a
dynamic setting using internal instruments. Here we control for the potential endogeneity
that arises due to correlation between pnjt and εj using flight fixed effects. For εnjt we
assume that it is uncorrelated with pnjt. This assumption is reasonable given that in Esco-
bari (2012) the point estimates in the within specification that consider fare as exogenous is
virtually the same as the point estimate that treats prices as endogenous.7 An alternative
approach would be to follow the methods developed in Berry et al.(1995). However, this
approach still needs exogenous instruments which in most cases use supply side variables.
[Table 3, about here]
The negative point estimate for the coefficient on LogPrice is statistically significant
at a 1% and it is consistent with a downward sloping demand. The coefficient in column 3
indicates that when the price of a ticket increases by 10%, quantity demanded decreases by
0.070 seats in a 100-seat aircraft.8 This is a reasonable value for the estimate because this is
what quantity demanded decreases each period prior to departure. If prices are 10% higher
throughout the selling season and there are 100 periods, then this particular flight will sell
7 seats less. The point estimate in column 4 that controls for flight fixed effects suggest a
7See Table IV, columns (2) and (8) in Escobari (2012).
8This calculation follows that (-0.007/100)(%∆Price), which is the marginal effect given that LogPrice
on the right-hand side. A 10% increase in price (%∆Price=10) decreases the dependent variable by 0.0007
that in a 100-seat aircraft is 0.07 seats.
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slightly larger. This coefficient also captures the disutility of a price increase. Notice that
while we have a number of variables reported in Table 2 besides Advance that can be part
of Equation (7) (e.g., carrier identifier, airport identifier, departure time and departure
date), we cannot separately identify the marginal effects of those variables because they
are perfectly collinear with the flight fixed effects αj . However we can estimate interaction
terms between those variables and LogPrice to see how the slope of the demand changes.
[Table 4, about here]
Table 4 estimates a model in which the slope α is allowed to change with the identity of
the carrier. Focusing on the last column of the table we can observe that the carrier with
the most responsive demand is Delta, followed by American Airlines and Air Canada. The
least responsive demand is the one for United. Notice that these differences have a relatively
big economic importance. For example, all else constant, a 10% price increase throughout
a 100-period selling season in a 100-seat aircraft decreases the quantity demanded by 18
seats in Delta flight (the largest response) and by slightly less than one seat in a United
flight (the smallest response).
More inelastic demands are usually associated with higher market power and the ability
to charge higher prices. Interestingly, Delta that is the carrier with the less responsive
demand is also the one with the lowest presence in this city pair. As column 1 in Table
2 shows, only 7.32% of the flights in this city pair belong to Delta. However, Delta also
charges the highest average prices ($234.36) as reported in column 5 of Table 2. Air Canada,
who is the dominant carrier in this city pair with 30.9% of the flights is not the carrier that
charges the highest average fares and does not have the most responsive (or nonresponsive)
demand. It is difficult to infer about any causality from these results because from the view
point of the econometrician, fares and market presence are jointly determined.
[Table 5, about here]
Table 5 shows how the effect of price on quantity demanded changes with the departure
date. Demand is less responsive the Friday (December 19) before Christmas and is it more
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responsive two days before Christmas. With the exception on December 19, there is not
a big economically significant difference in the response across the rest of the departure
dates - all coefficients lie between 0.011 and 0.015. On December 21, a 10% increase
in prices throughout a 100-period selling season in a 100-seat aircraft decreases quantity
demanded by 11.1 seats while on December 23 the effect is only 15.4 seats. Compared
with the other departure dates on Tuesday December 23 the demand is relatively more
responsive. This is interesting because that Tuesday is the day where there is a large
number of scheduled flights, 61 (see Table 1), which corresponds to 21.4% of the flights in
the sample (see column 1 in Table 2). An interesting point in Table 2 is the link between
higher fares and congestion. For example, the day in which the least number of flights were
scheduled is Saturday December 20 with only 37 flights. This is also the departure date with
the highest average fares ($279.85, see column 5, Table 2). Higher fares associated with
more congestion known ex-ante is evidence of systematic peak-load pricing, as previously
documented in Escobari (2009). It would be reasonable to observe that a more responsive
demand is associated with more congestion, but the estimates in Table 5 show that there
is little evidence that this is the case.
[Table 6, about here]
The regression estimates in Table 6 are presented to address the role of the departing
airport on the relationship between prices and quantity demanded. Column 4 shows that
the point estimates for Newark of for La Guardia are nearly the same, while the response
in flights that depart from John F. Kennedy is much smaller. The null that the coefficients
between Newark and La Guardia are the same is rejected at the any reasonable significance
levels. Notice that the last three rows in the table report the p-values of all the null
hypotheses that test for pair-wise differences in the coefficients across airports. The last
two rows show that there response in the John F. Kennedy airport is significantly different
that in the other two airports. A 10% increase in prices throughout a 100-period selling
season in a 100-seat aircraft decreases quantity demanded by 17.8 seats in a flight departing
from the John F. Kennedy airport, while for the La Guardia and for Newark this figure is
57.9 seats and 66.5 seats respectively.
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[Table 7, about here]
The final set of estimates is presented in Table 7. Here the goal is to assess the role
of the departure time on the effect that prices have on quantity demanded. We divide
flight departure times in three, morning if the flight departs before noon, afternoon if the
flight departs between noon and 5:00 p.m., and evening if the flight departs after 5:00 p.m.
The logit estimates in the last column that control for flight specific characteristics show
that quantity demanded is less responsive for flights departing in the afternoon and about
equally responsive for flights departing either in the morning or in the evening. The last
three rows reports the p-values for various null hypotheses that the coefficients are pair-wise
equal.
The logit estimator used in this paper has some limitations. As explained in Train
(2002), this logit estimator can represent systematic taste variation but not random taste
variation. Logit can approximate average tastes fairly well even when tastes are random,
but a probit or a mixed logit model may be better at including random taste variation. A
second potential limitation is that the logit model has the independence of from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) property, which means that the ratio of the probabilities of two alterna-
tives does not depend on any other alternative. Finally, the logit cannot handle unobserved
factors that are correlated over time. The main goal in this paper is to illustrate the use
of our unique data to estimate flight choice models, but other logit estimators can also be
used as extensions to this research that overcome some of the limitations outlined above.
In the next section we provide some examples for further research using similar datasets.
5 Potential Extensions
In this paper we estimated a simple random utility model, but our data and the discrete
choice modeling approach used in this paper can be extended to a number of settings. The
most obvious is to use these model estimates to forecast flight-level demand. This is or
particular importance for carriers because they use forecasted demand to schedule flights.
Additional potential extensions include measuring market power at the route level and
merger evaluation using the methods proposed in Nevo (2001) or welfare from new flights
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following techniques for the introduction of the minivan in Petrin (2002). Discrete choice
models can also be used to estimate pricing strategies in monopoly routes using single agent
dynamics as in Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1993), or Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002).
In these models agents are forward looking and maximize intertemporal payoffs. When
more than one carrier serves a route, the approach can as well follow Bajari et al.(2006) or
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) to estimate dynamic discrete games to model and estimate
the interaction between flights. The well-known challenges in these dynamic estimations
are the large number of agents, choices and states, and the existence of multiple equilibria,
which means an important computational burden. Igami (2013) overcomes these challenges
by modeling a small number of state spaces and choice sets to estimates a dynamic model
via maximum likelihood using the nested fixed-point algorithm of Rust (1987). Some of
these topics have already been addresses using posted prices but without discrete choice
models. Escobari (2012) estimates dynamic demand and dynamic pricing equations in a
setting where agents are forward looking. Moreover, Escobari and Lee (2012) estimate
price reaction functions to model the interaction between agents.
6 Conclusion
The choice of transportation mode is the most widely used example to illustrate random
utility models. This follows from the seminal work of Daniel McFadden (1974) that esti-
mates the trip mode choice in a study of travel demand. On this line modeling the choice
of flights has also been a popular research topic; however, obtaining the appropriated data
proved to be a difficult task. Previous studies either worked with stated preferences based
on survey data or with revealed preference based on data from a single seller. In this paper
we work with revealed preferences based on data on all flights from the international air
travel market between New York City and Toronto. Our study combines two key pieces
of information. First, we have posted prices at each time period and for all the available
booked and non-booked flights. This records the menu of options available to the buyers.
Second, we observe changes in inventory levels which allow us to identify choices. The
panel structure of the data with multiple transactions per flight at various points prior to
departure allows us to control for unobserved flight specific characteristics.
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Our demand estimates show that in a 100-seat flight a 10% increase in prices throughout
a 100-period selling season reduces quantity demanded by 7.7 seats. We further inquire
how this figure changes based on key sources of product differentiation in airline markets
- the departing airport, the identity of the carrier and the departure date and time. We
find that quantity demanded is more responsive to prices for Delta flights, followed by
flights from American and Air Canada. Moreover, there are significant differences in this
responsiveness across departure dates and departing airport. Demand is less responsive
for departures at John F. Kennedy than for departures at La Guardia or Newark. Finally,
quantity demanded is more responsive to prices for departures in the morning and in the
evening when compared to departures in the afternoon. We discuss the validity of our
assumptions and highlight potential areas for future research.
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Table 1: Flights by carrier and date
Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed
Dec 19 Dec 20 Dec 21 Dec 22 Dec 23 Dec 24 Total
American 12 8 11 12 13 11 67
Air Canada 19 9 13 20 20 16 97
Continental 8 5 7 8 8 6 42
Delta 4 4 4 4 4 3 23
Lan Chile 1 1 0 1 0 1 4
United 17 10 10 18 16 13 84
Total 61 37 45 63 61 50 317
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Main Variable Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Price 169.8 133.3 65 1,075
Advance 19.00 12.43 1 40
Bought 0.0191 0.137 0 1 156.93 111.87 65 1075
Carriers:
American 0.208 0.406 0 1 192.38 194.72 76 1075
Air Canada 0.309 0.462 0 1 144.57 69.15 81 736
Continental 0.138 0.345 0 1 155.21 114.51 77 1001
Delta 0.0732 0.261 0 1 234.36 203.77 105 953
Lan Chile 0.0129 0.113 0 1 130.45 25.84 123 220
United 0.258 0.438 0 1 173.42 105.25 65 1008
Departure Dates:
December 19 0.247 0.431 0 1 142.21 95.33 76 944
December 20 0.061 0.239 0 1 279.85 241.12 65 1075
December 21 0.108 0.311 0 1 180.72 98.35 81 738
December 22 0.231 0.422 0 1 128.38 38.72 76 472
December 23 0.214 0.41 0 1 193.73 159.52 81 1075
December 24 0.138 0.345 0 1 194.51 160.96 81 1075
Airports:
Newark Liberty 0.356 0.479 0 1 150.73 101.27 65 1001
La Guardia 0.515 0.500 0 1 171.87 133.96 76 1075
John F. Kennedy 0.129 0.336 0 1 214.46 186.27 87 1075
Departure Times:
Morning 0.447 0.497 0 1 142.06 95.94 65 1075
Afternoon 0.378 0.485 0 1 192.68 162.87 77 1075
Evening 0.175 0.380 0 1 191.55 130.96 81 953
Notes: The sample size is 560,244.
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Table 3: Demand Estimates, base model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Pooled FE Logit Logit
LogPrice -0.00642*** -0.0113*** -0.00704*** -0.00771***
(0.000416) (0.000465) (0.000459) (0.000501)
Advance -0.000154*** 0.000832 -0.000151*** -0.000166***
(1.53e-05) (0.00106) (1.50e-05) (1.44e-05)
Flight FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 560,244 560,244 560,244 560,244
Log-likelihood -52,836 -52,188
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Demand Estimates, the role of the carrier identity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Pooled FE Logit Logit
LogPrice
American -0.00630*** -0.0116*** -0.00724*** -0.0151***
(0.000429) (0.000481) (0.000480) (0.00111)
Air Canada -0.00573*** -0.0110*** -0.00662*** -0.00866***
(0.000440) (0.000491) (0.000485) (0.00115)
Continental -0.00590*** -0.0113*** -0.00681*** -0.00301***
(0.000446) (0.000498) (0.000495) (0.00112)
Delta -0.00699*** -0.0122*** -0.00828*** -0.0180***
(0.000426) (0.000476) (0.000484) (0.00189)
Lan Chile -0.00489*** -0.0104*** -0.00593*** -0.00558***
(0.000553) (0.000598) (0.000565) (5.81e-05)
United -0.00522*** -0.0103*** -0.00612*** -0.000838
(0.000427) (0.000477) (0.000472) (0.000832)
Advance -0.000153*** 0.000845 -0.000150*** -0.000158***
(1.53e-05) (0.00106) (1.49e-05) (1.42e-05)
Flight FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 560,244 560,244 560,244 560,244
Log-likelihood -52,720 -52,106
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Demand estimates, the role of the departure date
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Pooled FE Logit Logit
LogPrice
December 19 -0.0113*** -0.00324*** -0.0117*** -0.0149***
(0.000472) (0.00108) (0.000492) (0.000542)
December 20 -0.00761*** -0.0163*** -0.00862*** -0.0111***
(0.000439) (0.00123) (0.000459) (0.000504)
December 21 -0.00964*** -0.0117*** -0.0102*** -0.0128***
(0.000458) (0.00135) (0.000478) (0.000525)
December 22 -0.0117*** -0.0140*** -0.0121*** -0.0154***
(0.000476) (0.00166) (0.000494) (0.000546)
December 23 -0.0108*** -0.00915*** -0.0113*** -0.0143***
(0.000447) (0.000832) (0.000472) (0.000522)
December 24 -0.0102*** -0.0189*** -0.0107*** -0.0135***
(0.000452) (0.00115) (0.000474) (0.000525)
Advance -0.000190*** 0.000740 -0.000180*** -0.000214***
(1.55e-05) (0.00106) (1.47e-05) (1.39e-05)
Flight FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 560,244 560,244 560,244 560,244
Log-likelihood -52,476 -51,653
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Demand estimates, the role of the departing airport
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Pooled FE Logit Logit
LogPrice
Newark Liberty -0.00593*** -0.0112*** -0.00661*** -0.00665***
(0.000436) (0.000487) (0.000477) (0.000633)
La Guardia -0.00573*** -0.0107*** -0.00639*** -0.00579***
(0.000424) (0.000474) (0.000465) (0.000563)
John F. Kennedy -0.00679*** -0.0119*** -0.00766*** -0.0178***
(0.000420) (0.000471) (0.000466) (0.00148)
Advance -0.000152*** 0.000836 -0.000150*** -0.000160***
(1.53e-05) (0.00106) (1.49e-05) (1.43e-05)
Flight FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 560,244 560,244 560,244 560,244
Log-likelihood -52,781 -52,157
H0 : δEWR = δLGA (p-value) 0.0120 1.05e-07 0.00592 0.107
H0 : δLGA = δJFK (p-value) 0 0 0 0
H0 : δEWR = δJFK (p-value) 0 6.14e-11 0 0
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%. For k, m = EWR, LGA, JFK, and k 6= m the last three rows
present the p-values of the null H0 : δk = δm.
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Table 7: Demand estimates, the role of the departure time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Pooled FE Logit Logit
LogPrice
Morning -0.00777*** -0.0140*** -0.00856*** -0.00943***
(0.000450) (0.000510) (0.000495) (0.000679)
Afternoon -0.00736*** -0.0132*** -0.00814*** -0.00656***
(0.000429) (0.000485) (0.000476) (0.000533)
Evening -0.00682*** -0.0126*** -0.00759*** -0.00864***
(0.000431) (0.000486) (0.000474) (0.000698)
Advance -0.000168*** 0.000714 -0.000165*** -0.000169***
(1.54e-05) (0.00106) (1.50e-05) (1.44e-05)
Flight FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 560,244 560,244 560,244 560,244
Log-likelihood -52,791 -52,173
H0 : δMor = δAft (p-value) 7.02e-07 0 5.11e-07 6.33e-07
H0 : δAft = δEve (p-value) 1.65e-07 1.67e-10 4.00e-08 0.000688
H0 : δMor = δEve (p-value) 0 0 0 0.334
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%. For k, m = Morning (Mor), Afternoon (Aft), Evening (Eve), and
k 6= m the last three rows present the p-values of the null H0 : δk = δm.
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